Social Labour Plans, an Unequal outcome.
The Social and Labour Plan (SLP) system, together with
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) schemes under the Mining
Charter, is the main mechanism by means of which the mines are to channel the
proceeds of mining into benefits for the community and transformation of
society generally.
The failure of BBBEE
to transform mining ownership patterns is currently the bone of contention
between the Minister of Minerals, the Chamber of Mines and various other
parties before the Gauteng High Court.
The question before the court revolves around the “once empowered always
empowered” claims made by the mining houses and which is contested by the DMR
and the Minister as well as by a host of civil society formations. The legal definition of “once empowered
always empowered” aside, the question remains to what extent has BBBEE served
to bring about “substantial equality”.
The research currently under
consideration suggests that this remains an elusive reality for mining affected
communities.
In this sub section, we wish instead to consider the SLP`s
and its failure to contribute to the grand objectives of the MPRDA and the
constitution.
The MPRDA explicitly commits itself to take positive
measures to affect transformation. What is more, the Constitutional Court
found, in Agri SA case , that the MPRDA represents “legislative measures […]
taken to facilitate equitable access to opportunities in the mining industry”,
because black South Africans “were unable to benefit directly from the
exploitation of our mineral resources by reason of their landlessness,
exclusion and poverty”.
The purpose of the SLP model is to make it a statutory
licensing requirement for mining companies to develop a range of human
resources development and local economic development programmes. These
programmes, which are contained in the SLP document, become binding on the
company on the granting of a mining right by the Department of Mineral
Resources (DMR).
The system therefore uses the licensing process to compel
mining companies to provide benefits for workers and communities.
One of the most striking features of the regulatory framework
is that the primary legislative source of the SLP system, the Mineral and
Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA), says very little about the
definition, objectives and content of SLPs. The requirement to consult is vague
and non-existent except for one injunction in the DMR`s guideline to “consult
with communities”.
In a recent study by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies(CALS),
the authors of the report even go so far as to say that there are more barriers
to community participation than there are avenues to access information.
The CALS report questions whether it is appropriate for the
legislator to leave even the broad content of one of the most important planks
of reformist legislation to determination by the executive. This lack of
specificity unfortunately sets the tone for the entire system.
The result is
that, in practice, SLPs seem to belong more to mining companies than to the
intended beneficiaries of the system.
A regulatory system that provides and aims to satisfy the
duty bearer more than it does the rights holder, besides from not being a
pragmatic way to bring about transformation, is also fundamentally set up
against the constitution which, as confirmed in the Bengwenyama case, requires
robust and thorough consultation processes to meet the criteria of substantial
equality.
The CALS research, with a Study sample of 50 SLP`s and over
4500 data points, found among a broad range of findings that:
• Community
participation in developing SLP`s are lacking.
• SLP`s
generally do not incorporate long term planning or sustainability into its
plans.
• Less than
10% of SLP`s are clear on how the SLP`s are communicated to stakeholders.
• The
exclusivity and privacy of labour plans are a first step in wrong direction.
This includes practical difficulties of obtaining the report and printing etc.
• SLP`s
never talk about the history, of what happened before the start of the SLP, so
efforts to drive transformation starts from scratch without consideration of
past injustices.
• There are
no contextual or ethnographic details to the SLP and therefore it is unlikely
that the SLP will be able to address the core transformational issues.
• SLP`s do
not have baselines from which they operate and targets are changed regularly
thus not being able to track their effectiveness.
• They do
not devote equal attention to negative and positive social impacts in that
exclusion of negative impacts reduce the SLP to a sales pitch.
• The
correlation between impact of mining and benefits of the SLP are not always
clear.
• SLP`s do
not cater for population influx and recognition that the community
fundamentally changes with the introduction of mining operations.
• Amendments
to the SLP are not required by law beyond the approval of the minister and no
reasoning is provided for why targets or projects are changed.
• The
language of the SLP is always in English and never translated to local
languages thus excluding a significant portion of the community.
• 25% of
SLP`s link the performance of commodity prices to their ability to deliver on
the commitments in the SLP.
By the Legislators own admission when faced with evidence
presented before the committee that SLP mitigation measures have not worked,
with the failures of Lonmin in Marikana serving as a case in point, the committee
said in its report of the hearings of 5 June 2013:
“When we conduct oversights, we come back depressed. Because
before you enter into a mine, you walk through a sea of poverty. ... In our own
experience these Social and Labour Plans are indeed not implemented...Mining
communities lament that here, within our area we extract the wealth of the
country but there is no drop that comes back to us as the mining community.”
The legislation and regulation of SLP`s thus provides a
perfect circular outcome that facilitates and countenances a system that fails
to deliver on its constitutional mandate. The law was proposed by the DMR, as
specifically vague and virtually unenforceable, adopted and passed into law by
the legislature, knowing full well that its outcomes, being vague and ambiguous
cannot be guaranteed, thus limiting the oversight it could enforce on the DMR
and leaving the constitutional imperative of transformation in terms of
substantial equality as a non-starter. A
perfect systemic failure which allows the DMR, the Legislator and the Corporate
to all be able to show compliance while actually not delivering anything
substantial.
In AASA`s Precious Metals II, A Systemic Inequality Report,
the Mapela case study, with its longitudinal approach is well placed to capture
this failure as it shows that over the long term, no substantial transformation
has taken place, indeed the life circumstances of the community of Mapela has
regressed.
SLP`s and its failures are thus
a good case study of a systemic inequality, that is allowed to exist,
unchecked, unregulated and endorsed by legislation.

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