Paper on Political Development and Modernism
Introduction.
“Every
empire, however, tells itself and the world that it is unlike all other
empires,
that
its mission is not to plunder and control but to educate and liberate.”
—Edward Said (2003) as quoted by (Whyte, 2016)
“Third
Worldism” and the idea of political development as a modern social science,
which can be utilised in the effort to assist or advance the globalisation of
the world community, cannot be divorced from the broader debates raging in
society today and in fact are central to those debates in many ways.
The
question of whether this discourse has assisted and contributed to world
political development, whether as a sustainable solution or whether as part of
the challenges faced by the world today, remains largely unanswered by the
establishment academia, despite the bold suggestion by some that we have
reached the end of history and its culmination in a particular western
understanding of political development, namely the particular type of liberal
democracy emanating from the developed west.
The “victory”
of liberal western values and neo liberal economics was held up as the final
answer to the deep unresolved questions of liberty and equality. This final
victory was to be premised on the supremacy of private property underpinned by
modern enlightenment values of liberty and equality.
While
conceding that the essays we have been asked to reference in this assessment
are somewhat dated and engages with a “conceptual dinosaur” of the “Third World”,
the essays are nonetheless illuminating in the manner in which a construct and
conceptualisation of political development, extracted and adapted from a
particular western worldview which is deeply entangled and stained by the use
of violence and accumulation to assert its correctness and validity, is passed off as a legitimate scientific
endeavour.
Under
the cloak of scientific enquiry, and ensconced in an acute denial of any
epistemology that does not conform, the discipline seems to cling tenaciously
to its blissful ignorance of the limits of its own paradigm. The core arguments
expressed in these three essays remain firmly locked into a Kuhnian paradigm
which ignores significant elements and characteristics of the dialectical
nature of development in both the political and economic sense thus rendering
the entire discourse sterile and hollow.
This
paradigmatic limitation often sets up debates within this discourse in such a
manner that key elements of the contending paradigm are lost to broader
consideration as they do not fit neatly into the paradigm we are called on to
uncritically accept.
The
interlocutors to this debate often attempt to draw out usable and useful characteristics
from the contending paradigm, but often fail to appreciate the nuances intended
by the contending paradigm, and end up divorcing the characteristics or
elements from its original context.
Yet it
is precisely in this fragmentation and atomisation of ideas that the core
methodological underpinnings of this constrained paradigm often fails to fully
appreciate the globalisation imperative, its driving dynamic and logic and the
manner in which this logic and imperative to compete, imposes itself.
By
attempting to overstate the atomistic and manifold nature of particular
elements within the social metabolism, the logic of domination is not only
obscured, but the resulting atomisation obtains towards a means of manipulation
and control as well.
The
Management of difference thus becomes what Mahmood Mamdani in his book Define and Rule, calls “the holy cow of the modern study of society,
just as it is central to modern statecraft.” It is, he argues, “under indirect rule colonialism that the
definition and management of difference was developed as the essence of
governance.” (Mamdani, 2013, p. 2)
To the extent that the underlying historical and material drivers are excluded
from consideration, the contributors
often fail to acknowledge the interrelatedness and interdependence of the
globalising imperative of world economics, and more particularly so when
domination and competition has featured so prominently in its historical
unfolding.
While all
three papers we consider in this assessment does a sterling job in unpacking
various elements of “Third World” political development and indeed they do
succeed in not only highlighting critical shortcomings within the discipline
but also contribute towards workable and practical solutions, we hope to show
that they all fail spectacularly to realise the limitations of the constrained
paradigms upon which they construct their castles. As a direct result of this
conceptual blind spot, the solutions proffered are often only useful in the
treatment of the symptoms of what the authors perceive as the problems.
Far from
providing sustainable solutions to the political and economic underdevelopment
of the “Third World”, the constrained Eurocentric analyses provided by this
discourse has more likely contributed in an overall sense to continuing
inequality, underdevelopment and denial of agency to the vast majority of the
world`s population than to sustainable solutions that will affirm the “end of
history”.
In this
essay we have been asked to critically assess three specific essays in relation
to the question of whether political development and modernisation provided a
sustainable solution to political and economic underdevelopment in the “Third
World”.
In this
regard we will consider the essays by Samuel Huntington, published in 1965
entitled; Political Development and Political
Decay (Huntington, 2013) , Handelman`s
2011 essay; Understanding Development
(in) The Challenge of Third World Development (Handelman, 2013) as well as Randall and Theobald`s 1998 essay entitled Towards a politics of modernisation and
development. (Randall, 2013)
In order
to critically assess their individual and collective arguments and to identify
the limits of their paradigmatic horizon, we will endeavour to provide a brief
synopsis of each argument as articulated in each essay.
This
will allow us to then consider a critique of the essays in which we weigh up
the validity and usefulness of their approach in helping us to consider the
question before us.
The
critique of each essay will be followed by an attempt to posit an answer to the
question posed of whether the discourse of political development and
modernisation provided a sustainable solution to political and economic
underdevelopment and why.
A brief
overview of the three essays.
Samuel
Huntington.
In his
essay entitled; Political Development and
Political Decay, Samuel Huntington (1965) argues that a distinction must be
made between political development and modernisation in order to understand the
full import of de Tocqueville`s
assertion that ;
“among the laws
that rule human societies, there is one that seems to be more precise and clear
than all the others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of
associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the
equality of conditions is increased.”
(Huntington, 2013, p. 1)
This art
of associating, Huntington argues, is a “precondition
for civilised society” and he
equates this to the direct correlation between the rates of participation in
the political system and the rates of organisation and institution within the
political system. If these variables are out of line as they were at the time,
namely participation rates are high but the rate of organisation and
institution low, then the entire civilisation project “is in danger, if not already
undermined.”
Huntington’s
central theses is thus that rapid increases in mobilisation and participation
in the political system, which is a direct result and principal political
aspect of increased modernisation, undermines political institutions and does
not produce political development but political decay.
Participation,
according to Huntington, “distinguishes
modern politics from traditional politics” while contending that the “new world political culture will be a
political culture of participation.”
Huntington
sees the political system as a complex admixture of competing interests in
which recurring patterns of behaviour are institutionalised as particular
behaviours gain in value and thus stability. It is thus the level of
institutionalisation and organisation which ultimately determines the modernity
of the society. Institutions can accordingly be measured as part of the
scientific project by the particular society’s institutions` adaptability,
complexity, autonomy and coherence.
Not only
are the relative level of institutionalisation of a society offered as a
measure of political development, Huntington goes on to suggest that the public
interest is coequal to the interests of political institutions. He suggests
this as an extension of the Aristotelian marriage of democracy and oligarchy. “What is good for the Presidency is good for
the country.”(p. 28)
Huntington
makes the case that most modernising countries are “buying rapid social modernization at the price of political
degeneration” and further makes the explicit connection to new states
succumbing to corruption “once the colonial
guardians have departed”, and how this gives rise to oligarchs and
demagogues.(p.30-31)
The only
way to overcome this barbarous nativism, Huntington suggests that “effective political institutions are
necessary for stable and eventually democratic government”, and a “precondition of sustained economic growth.”(p.32)
None of
the political development, which forms the cornerstone of the entire essay, is
necessarily linked to democracy as a pre-requisite by Huntington’s reckoning.
Instead he deals extensively with institutions and the Party institution in
particular, as the nexus from which springs a stable economically prosperous
modern society. In making this claim,
and in a brief peep into the limited paradigmatic horizon offered by his
argument, Huntington suggests that “American
policy” should , require “at least
one strong non-communist party”, which must be supported to a “dominant position” in “modernizing countries” in order to
drive home the advantages of Western political development.(p.44)
Handelman.
Handelman`s
2011 essay; Understanding Development, on the other hand, sets out to argue
that America`s interest in the political development of the “Third World” is
predicated mainly on the simple fact that the “warfare, internal violence” and the “massive human suffering” brought about by “insurgency, religious intolerance, poverty and revolutionary conflict,
ethnically based massacres and political repression” that “ultimately draws our (Americans) attention.” (Handelman,
2013, p. 55)
Handelman,
while suggesting that his theses will make use of a multi-disciplinary approach
argues that even though economic, social and political underdevelopments are
closely related to each other, they are nonetheless “not perfectly correlated”. (p.57)
Handelman
does not divert from the general narrative articulated by Huntington but spends
considerable time unpacking reams of data of how under the rubric of economic,
social and political components, certain parts of the Third World share similarities,
while in others they are significantly different. Handelman then uses the cover
of a “complex relationship between political, economic and social development to
point out that “some scholars” have
argued that “authoritarian government
might be helpful in the early to middle stages of industrialisation in order to
control labor unions and worker`s wages, thereby increasing company profits and
attracting new external investment”, in an uncanny echo of Huntingtons` Aristotelian
marriage of democracy and oligarchy. (p.68-69)
In a
postmodernist twist to the narrative that seeks to place responsibility for the
chronic and systemic underdevelopment at the door of the underdeveloped,
Handelman invokes a relativist approach in arguing that “ [f]requently, their
(scholarly an analysts) evaluations
(of the causes of underdevelopment) reflect
their personal background, country of origin, or ideology.”(p.69)
While
Handelman debunks modernity to some extent by claiming that its proponents “were too optimistic and too simplistic in
its initial views of change”, and concurs with Huntington that they “erroneously assumed that ‘all good things go
together’”, he nonetheless holds out its later variations of “conflict theory” and the “reconciliation approach” as presenting
the possibility that “developing nations
can simultaneously achieve goals previously thought to be incompatible.”(p.69-71)
On the
other hand, Handelman makes short shrift of the “dependency theory” on the tenuous basis of Cardoso`s suggestion
that countries could modernize and expand
their economies while still remaining dependent on foreign banks and MNC`s. (p.73-75)
Handelman
unfortunately does not articulate exactly how the expansion and modernization
of the economy reduces dependency, but
does conceded that the dependency approach offered useful corrections to
modernisation theory by highlighting the importance of international trade,
finance, and investment and the subsequent dependence of third world countries
on the core.(p.75) Yet Handelman rejects the notion that dependent countries
are not able to influence their condition citing East Asia`s economic miracle
and India and Brazil`s ascendance up the economic pyramid of nation states. (p.76)
In the
end analyses Handelman argues that further analyse should be based more firmly
on empirical data rather than on abstractions, and then goes on to
inadvertently show how empirical data can be used as a postmodernist aversion
to anything but a relativistic view of the world. (p.78-79)
Randall and
Theobald.
Randall
and Theobald`s 1998 essay entitled Towards
a politics of modernisation and development, ends up making a similar, if
much more extensive and critical, argument to the two essays already considered
above. Their essay unpacks the origins of the three key strands of thought
prevalent at the time, namely modernisation, political development and
dependency theory as concepts. (Handelman, 2013)
Modernisation,
they argue, is derived from two main streams, namely a pyscho-cultural
perquisite to modernisation derived from Max Weber`s thesis on the relationship
between Protestantism and the development of capitalism, and a structural
element which focuses on social differentiation
as the central datum in social change. The central theses can thus be
expressed thus; as society becomes
increasingly complex more specialised structures emerge. This approach conceives
society as a system made up of a number
of parts and subsystems where the integrity of the whole is provided for by the
functional interdependence of these subsystems. (p.85-86)
This
view also affirms the pattern variables, they argue, where social roles in
society are patterned towards five basic behaviours. These behaviours are
derived from specific dichotomies that manifest as a preference towards
affective neutrality rather than affective decision making, self-orientation
rather than collective orientation, universalistic views rather a particularistic
view, judging of performance based on achievement criteria rather than
ascriptive (based on context) criteria and lastly towards a functional
specificity rather than a functional diffuseness. (p.86-87)
As for
political development, the authors show how the rise and demise of the term and
concept was closely linked to the role played by funding institutions and how
academia naturally sort to couch their research in terms acceptable to the
funding institutions. The dubious start notwithstanding, the authors trace the
assumptions underpinning political development, and identify three key
assumptions. They list these as a preconceived assumption “that political development was desirable and to be encouraged, that it
was happening and thus could not be ignored and that developed systems would
resemble existing western political systems”. (p.101)
These
assumptions, the authors draw from Lucian
Pye who tried to introduce some order into the debate and who himself drew out
three key themes from more than ten different interpretations.
These
themes were a general concern with “equality”
and the involvement of the masses in political systems, the importance of the
growing capacity of the political system
and an increasing differentiation of
political roles and structures. (P.101-102)
In the
end the authors suggest that the mistake of political development theorists was
in “assuming that political development
was a concept that could be defined as opposed to a useful political slogan.”
It was, they argue, entirely unrealistic and was criticised for its ethnocentricity, its naïve optimism, and its
failure to recognise the economic dependence of third world countries on the
west.(p.103)
Despite
this damning conclusion, the authors saw a reincarnation of political
development in the democratisation waves which spread through the developing
world during the late 1980`s and 1990`s and its revival of many of the central
themes of modernisation and subsequently many of the same criticisms are
carried over too. (p.103-110)
The authors
pay considerably more attention to dependency theory than the first two essays
and consider the example of Brazil in great detail arriving ultimately at the
conclusion that “dependency theory has
marginalised the political in favour of the macroeconomic.” (p.119) This
conclusion echo’s both Huntington and Handelman in the ongoing dialectal battle
to determine which element of the interrelated globalising economy and
political system should be given preference in analysis.
A brief
critique.
In this
section I will constrain the critique to briefly attempt to consider the
conceptual constraints of the individual essays but also the discourse of
political development in general, followed by a consideration of the rejection
of dependency theory by the three essays and the overall focus of political
development on participation or democracy more generally.
A Eurocentric
Narrative.
The
three essays appear to broadly cohere around common themes and construct a view
of the world deeply embedded in the Western enlightenment tradition. All three
authors rely heavily on the assumptions and concepts underpinning what some
have termed Eurocentric arguments. It is however the work of Randall and
Theobald that best helps to illuminate the deeply implicated Eurocentric
strains of a postmodern attempt to reconfigure the old art of indirect rule.
Randall
and Theobald`s contention that the three core assumptions of the Political Development
movement were that political development was “desirable and to be encouraged, that it was happening and thus could
not be ignored and that developed systems would resemble existing western
political systems”, lays bare the thread that runs through the project as a
whole. The project thus appears as an anti-historical attempt to engineer the
functional and structural contours of a global world polity through imposing a
Universalist and specifically ethnocentric world view.
At the
heart of the discourse on political development, and as Randall and Theobald
show, lays the firmly intertwined relationship between funding and academia and
how the interests of both the state and private property can be inserted into
the academic discourse. Efforts to downplay these interconnected influences do
not help the discourse maintain its scientific integrity.
Indirect Rule.
The
entanglement and interplay between knowledge and rule is of course an age old relationship and should thus not
surprise us that the practise should reinvent itself and redefine itself from
time to time. Mahmood Mamdami in his lectures, which he publishes as a book
entitled Define and Rule, argues for
the concept of an “indirect rule state”
which he maintains, is the “quintessentially
modern form of rule in colonial settings.” (Mamdani, 2013, p. 1)
Mamdani
argues that indirect rule differs from modes of rule in previous Western
empires in two important ways. First in that “previous empires focused on conquered elites rather than the mass of
the colonised” and second that they aimed to “eradicate differences through a policy of cultural and sometimes
political assimilation of colonized elites”. (p.1-2)
This
practise was to change with the introduction of indirect rule which sort to go
beyond the control of elites in a colonised state to the control of the masses.
This control was achieved through the development and reinforcing of new and
existing differences in populations. Ethnic, religious and cultural differences
were emphasised and institutionalised and it is under this new type of indirect
rule, argues Mamdani, that “the
definition and management of differences was developed as the essence of
governance.” (p.2)
The
immediate coherence between Mamdani`s argument and the recognition within the
discourse of political development itself of the general thematic consistency
towards mass participation is not accidental and correlates Mamdani`s meta
narrative with the “scientific” consistency demanded by political development
theorists and hopefully shows the relevance and necessity for a deeper
historical analyses which acknowledges and incorporates the macro influences on
the micro institutions.
Noam
Chomsky, renowned historian, linguist and philosopher, has done considerable
work on tracing the north-south (developed – underdeveloped/ first world -third
world) divides and affirms Mamdani`s contention and brings the meta narrative
to contemporary political dynamics when he makes the argument that “after the Second World War, “ for the first
time a single state (The United States) had such overwhelming wealth and power
that its planners could realistically design and execute a global vision.” (Chomsky, 1997, p. 74)
Chomsky,
echoing the dependency theory protagonists, argues that “the basic reasoning (of the US policy of foreign domination and
control) is spelled out with particular lucidity in US planning documents and
illustrated in practice with consistency.” He goes on to identify two key
pillars of the US foreign policy which he identifies as firstly an approach by
the US which identifies, independent nationalism as unacceptable to the US
state and where the function of the “ third world is to provide services for the
rich offering cheap labour, resources, markets, opportunities for investment
and export of pollution.” (p.75)
Secondly,
Chomsky argues that any form of “ultra-nationalism”
which “appears successful in terms that
might be meaningful for the poor people elsewhere is a heinous crime”. This
rejection of alternative independent models of success, Chomsky argues, was
captured by Henry Kissinger when he warned of the “contagious example” of
Allende`s Chile. He also refers to Oxfam`s characterisation of this phenomenon
as “the threat of a good example”. (p.75)
To
ignore the role of dominant states and to underplay the macroeconomic
interconnections of private capital and the state, is to base ones analyses on
a deficient contextual underpinning and must result in a sterile argument that
may have found some acceptance within a constrained scientific paradigm, but
contemporary discourse requires a more authentic holism that is not beholden to
narrow ethnocentric social, economic and political science.
Dependency
Theory.
On the
question of dependency theory, the three essays, with the exception of Randal
and Theobald, makes short shrift of the dependency theory. Rejecting the theory
more or less out of hand on the tenuous basis that it fails as a theory because
of the existence of the East Asian Tigers and the rise of India and China as
modern industrialised states and furthermore that dependency theory
marginalises the political in favour of the macroeconomic.
As to
the first conclusion, which according to the three essayists, disqualifies
dependency theory from further and proper consideration is the existence of a
new tier of dependent states that have managed to exit the “ third world” and
now hovers somewhere in-between the developed world and the underdeveloped
world.
This
occurrence they argue renders the entire theory moot as the existence of these
states disproves that a dependent state cannot influence its own outcomes. As
hinted at above, the false dichotomy created by the interlocutors which
suggests that one must either be one or the other is symptomatic of the binary
discourse which seeks to shut out any dissenting voices and is broadly an
attempt to reject alternatives on scurrilous grounds. This false dichotomy also
serves to make the case for reducing the
focus on dominant players who may enjoy significantly more influence and power
over dependent states than the authors of the essays are willing to concede,
less it displaces their own theses completely.
The
existence of states in the middle ground between dominant and dependent states
could just as easily be explained by the economic outcomes that obtain in any
capitalistic society. The existence of a middle class could just as easily be
ascribed to the economic outcomes consistent with an economic system that
produces working class, middle class and bourgeois classes. The authors
unfortunately do not explain why this should necessarily be a dichotomy and do
not explain the grounds for such a binary approach. In the absence of such
explanations one is left to conclude that the authors create a false dichotomy
to obscure the defects of their own analyses.
Furthermore,
Randall and Theobald reject dependency theory as it marginalises the political
in favour of the macro-economic. To this argument one is aware that the core
distinction made by the authors is an ideological one. It is generally accepted
that most development theorists arrive at their analyses via a process of
Marxist historical materialism. This means in essence that the analyses which
produces dependency theory is premised on an understanding that society`s
political institutions are shaped in no small measure (in fact it is by this
account the dominant measure) by the relations which underpin that society`s
economic interactions. Thus for a theorist making the case for dependency
theory the economic relations of society are critical to understanding why the
political institutions are constructed the way they are.
Thus the
fundamental difference which derives from opposing ideological world views is
not only a methodological question, but also an ideological one. Modernism and
political development derives from a Western enlightenment value system which
places Europe and the West at the centre of world development while dependency
theory derives from a colonised historiography which recognises multiple
epistemologies but which utilises the Marxists tools of historical materialism
to arrive at an understanding of world development in which the economic base
determines the political superstructure.
Can
these be reconciled? The obvious answer for developmental theorists and despite
their premature victory chorus of the end of history, for modernists too, lies
in how ideas are contested and how the material realities shape and interact
with those ideas. Thus dismissing overtly macroeconomic heavy analyses, is
perhaps a repeat of the mistake alluded to above. Creating false binaries in
which one has to choose one or the other, is not useful for the scientific
project and reduces analyses in the complexity and sophistication of its
output. That a dialectical relationship exists between the economic base and
the political superstructure is generally by now an accepted characteristic of
social analysis and each impacts on the other. While a rejection of either
characteristic is not useful, the question that begs an answer is how political
institutions in the superstructure can be isolated to such an extent that it is
immune to the economic logic which underpins its existence. In short it cannot
exist outside of the logic and social relations and indeed is more often than
not a reflection of the dialectical interplay between the economic and the
political.
Mass Political
Participation
Lastly
we will consider the thematically consistent predilection for political
development theorists to manage and define the participatory element of the
discourse.
As
indicated above, the move from direct to indirect rule in the study of Western
Imperial ambitions have produced significant evidence to suggest that the end
of formal colonialism did not in fact mean the end of informal neo colonialism.
Mamdani makes the argument that the move from direct to indirect rule was well
documented and was transmitted through the British and other empires of the
late nineteenth century through the works of Sir Henry Maine.
Sir
Henry Maine`s well known text, Ancient
Law, was used as the basis for colonial services all over the occupied
world, to develop policies. The result says Mamdami, was “a mode of rule undergirded by a set of institutions with a racialized
and tribalized historiography,(and) a bifurcation between civil and customary
law.” (Mamdani, 2013, p. 6)
This
rule used benign language according to Mamdami and evolved from “non-interference” post 1857 to one of “protection” by the end of the nineteenth
century. This language was of course consistent throughout the cold war period
and still persists, even today ala Irag and Afganistan.
The
larger point Maine was making Mamdani argues, was that “the West represented an exception in human social evolution”. From
the standpoint of world history, only the West could claim to be the site for
the devolvement of progress: ‘…the stationary
condition of the human race is the rule, the progressive the exception.’”
(p.16)
From
this logic flowed the central assumptions of political development; “that political development was desirable and
to be encouraged, that it was happening and thus could not be ignored and that
developed systems would resemble existing western political systems.”
The
convergence of these two conceptual pillars of western imperial ambition,
namely indirect rule which involves the management of the masses through the
definition and management of difference and the exceptional nature of European
society that must naturally be transmitted to the rest of the world, is brought
to bear on the specific definition of democracy as conceived in Western
society.
Samir
Amin, in his seminal work, Eurocentrism,
argues that the enlightenment thought on which the Western modernisation and
political development movement is based, “offers
us a concept of reason that is inextricable associated with that of
emancipation, yet the emancipation is defined and limited by what capitalism
requires and allows.” (Amin, 2009, p. 14)
Emancipating
reason, Amin argues, is expressed in the
classical triplet: liberty, equality and property and the constituent elements
of this triplet is considered to be naturally harmonious and complementary to
each other. Thus the claim that the market equals democracy has remained a cornerstone
of this ideology. (p.15)
Thus
Samin introduces a third element to be considered when evaluating the role of
democracy in the political development discourses. It makes a direct link at
the philosophical level between democracy and the market.
But this
liberty and equality is necessarily limited by what the economy demands and
requires. Hence Huntington and Handel are convinced that the existence of
democracy or oligarchy is first and foremost dependent on what is necessary for
the development of the economy.
The
phenomenon of what Randal and Theobald calls the third wave of democracy, Amin
also describes as the “Democratic Fraud.” (Amin, 2011) This effort to
illuminate the empty procedural nature of representative democracy also finds
echo in the work of Alison J Ayers who argues that the “democratisation project seeks to constitute neoliberal polities with a
procedural notion of democracy.” (Ayers, 2013, p. 225)
Amin
argues that this hollow version of democratic control not only results in the
relative de- politicisation of very large segments of society it is also “simultaneously the condition for
reproduction of the system without changes other than those it can control and
absorb – the condition of its own stability.” (Amin, 2011)
The Democratic Farce then, according to Amin,
displays itself as offering alternatives. The farce is based on “consensus ideology, which excludes by
definition serious conflicts between interests and between visions of the
future.”
Amin`s
contention is consequently that “without
the presence of real alternative perspectives democracy is non-existent”.
The
democracy project is thus deeply implicated with an elite driven representative
and procedural form which broadly disempowers the masses from direct
participation in the affairs that directly affects them. The focus on democracy
is also implicated by its direct relation to the definition and management of
difference as first articulated by the intellectuals of the British Empire in
their endeavours to foster new forms of rule and also contemporaneously implicated
in the neoliberal political development tradition`s efforts to link democracy
to the concept and control of the markets,
Thus
modernising political development theory, as much as it might wish to converge
towards an Aristotelian marriage of democracy and oligarchy, is implicitly tied
to the enlightenment liberalism which must speak to an emancipatory discourse
if it wishes to remain consistent. The discourse thus seeks to overcome this
contradiction by foregrounding a version of democracy which is hollowed out of
its content and formalised as a procedure, thus reconciling its contradictory
tendency towards oligarchy by providing the masses with a mask of democracy
while maintaining oligarchical control in practise.
Conclusion
To
answer the question posed as to whether political development and modernisation
has provided sustainable solutions to the problems of Third World States, we
look to the three essays once again to consider how the discourse itself set up
the answer to this question.
Huntington
held out that a strong political party as the foremost institution of the
modernising state should preceded the development of other institutions. The
kernel of his proposed solution is thus the effective political organisation,
whether this is achieved through military juntas, strong personalities or free
elections was irrelevant to his considerations. What mattered most was organisational
strength.(p.44-45)
Handelman,
on the other hand vacillates and concedes that
both sides (modernising and dependency theories) “presents a reasonable argument with accurate statistics”, but he
claims that the answer in terms of which is more correct is to be found in the
“statistical interpretation”.(p79-80)
In his prevarication on making any assertive claim to the correct path required
for political development of third world states, Handelman nonetheless concedes
in his conclusion that the “current
global economic crises will worsen the socioeconomic conditions in many parts
of the developing world for years to come, especially in the world`s poorest
nations”. (p.80)
For
Randall and Theobald, the critique of the dependency theories revolves around
either the lack of attention to the degree of diversity at the periphery and,
second and relatedly, a tendency to concede too little impact to these forces
and especially to the state. From
a dependency perspective the fundamental weakness of the modernisation approach
was its total neglect of the economic dimension, particularly its international
aspect. Unfortunately the reader does not include the conclusions reached by
the authors but one can assume by their assessment of both strands that they
did not believe that either was sufficient to provide sustainable solutions.
The
United Nations in its effort to provide a sustainable solution has confirmed
the need for sustainable solutions are now more critical than ever before. They
conform that;
Billions
of our citizens continue to live in poverty and are denied a life of dignity.
There are rising inequalities within and among countries. There are enormous
disparities of opportunity, wealth and power. Gender inequality remains a key
challenge. Unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, is a major concern.
Global health threats, more frequent and intense natural disasters, spiralling
conflict, violent extremism, terrorism and related humanitarian crises and
forced displacement of people threaten to reverse much of the development
progress made in recent decades. Natural resource depletion and adverse impacts
of environmental degradation, including desertification, drought, land
degradation, freshwater scarcity and loss of biodiversity, add to and
exacerbate the list of challenges which humanity faces. Climate change is one
of the greatest challenges of our time and its adverse impacts undermine the
ability of all countries to achieve sustainable development.
The
World Employment and Social Outlook – Trends 2015 report provides a forecast of
global unemployment levels and explains the factors behind this ever worsening trend,
as including continuing inequality and falling wage shares, affirming the
interrelated nature of the global market. (ILO, 2015)
With the
extent of the world economic and structural unemployment crisis becoming ever
more difficult to deny, even the IMF, the main institutional driver of
neoliberal economics over the last 4 decades, now admits that neoliberal economics
has failed. In their recently released paper
“Neoliberalism: Oversold?”, the IMF note that the economic growth that
neoliberal policies are designed to foster is difficult to discern, but that
the inequality caused by austerity and lassez-faire policies is palpable. “The evidence of the economic damage from
inequality suggests that policymakers should be more open to redistribution
than they are.” (Geier, 2016)
The
argument dismissing the importance and even centrality of economic
considerations on the ability of “developing” nations to deal with the
political and economic development necessary to achieve “developed” status, has
lost its veneer of credibility in the face of the overwhelming evidence
pointing to the interlinkages and dependency of the political and social on the
economic conditions. This is not to say that the political and social do not
play a role or that they do not indeed impact on the economic conditions, but
rather that the fundamental analysis which starts with the economic has proven
to be a much more useful starting point than the cultural or social.
Sufficient
evidence exists to show that from its earliest conception during the colonial
period, where Amin argues that by the 1800`s there existed “capitalist centres and peripheries” (Amin,
2009, p. 244)
and further shows that others such as Ramkrisha
Mukherjee and Amiya Kumar Bagchi have offered a history of the beginnings of an
autonomous capitalist development in India, supplemented by a history of its
systematic destruction by British colonization.” (Amin, 2009, p. 246)
These
early beginnings are re-emphasised in the Structural Adjustment Programmes of
the latter part of the 20th century which served mainly to further
impoverish dependent states, as recently admitted by the IMF.
If this
assertion is true, then the answer to the question posed in this essay has to
be that political development and modernisation has not provided a sustainable
solution to the problems faced by the “ third world” and instead has been shown
to be a grand , though generically useful, distraction to the core problems facing
the world today.
Bibliography
Amin, S., 2009. Eurocentrism. New York:
Monthly Press Review.
Amin, S., 2011. The
Democratic Fraud and the Universalist Alternative. In: Monthly Review. New
York: Monthly Review Press.
Ayers, A. j., 2013.
Demystifying Democratisation: the global constitution of (neo)liberal polities
in Africa. In: F. R, ed. Political Develooment and Political Economy.
Reader for PLC3703. Pretoria: University of South Africa, pp. 225-242.
Chomsky, N., 1997. World
Orders, Old and New. First ed. London: Pluto Press.
Geier, B., 2016. Fortune.com.
[Online]
Available at: http://fortune.com/2016/06/03/imf-neoliberalism-failing/
[Accessed 26 August 2016].
Available at: http://fortune.com/2016/06/03/imf-neoliberalism-failing/
[Accessed 26 August 2016].
Handelman, H., 2013.
Understanding Development. In: R. Francis, ed. Political Development and
Political economy. Reader for PLC3703. Pretoria: University of South
Africa, pp. 55-81.
Huntington, S., 2013.
Political Development and Political Decay. In: R. Francis, ed. Poltical
Development and Politcal Economy: Reader for PLC 3703. Pretoria:
Department of Political Sciences Unisa, p. 1.
ILO, I. L., 2015. International
Labour Organisation. [Online]
Available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2015/WCMS_337069/lang--en/index.htm
[Accessed 26 August 2016].
Available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/weso/2015/WCMS_337069/lang--en/index.htm
[Accessed 26 August 2016].
Mamdani, M., 2013. Define
and Rule. 2013 ed. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
Randall, V. &. T.
R., 2013. Towards a politics of modernisation and development. In: R. Francis,
ed. Political Development and Political Economy. Reader for PLC3703. Pretoria:
University of South Africa, pp. 127-148.
Whyte, J., 2016. Academia.edu.
[Online]
Available at: https://www.academia.edu/28079562/The_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_the_Persistence_of_Colonialism?auto=view&campaign=weekly_digest
[Accessed 03 September 2016].
Available at: https://www.academia.edu/28079562/The_Responsibility_to_Protect_and_the_Persistence_of_Colonialism?auto=view&campaign=weekly_digest
[Accessed 03 September 2016].

Comments
Post a Comment